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ABSTRACT: In 2004 the New Zealand Government reviewed the New Zealand Building Act. 
The review was prompted by increasing concern at the lack of weather tightness evident in 
buildings constructed since the initial performance based Building Act was passed in 1991. 
Now, in 2010, some six years after the 2004 review and against a continued backdrop of non-
performing leaking buildings, the Government is preparing to review the Building Act again. 
This paper will provide a brief history of the controversy surrounding building under 
performance in New Zealand since the initial Act was passed. It will summarize the changes 
brought about by the 2004 Building Act. It will also discuss the reasons for the Government‟s 
desire to yet again initiate amendments, particularly in areas related to the exemption of minor 
works, low risk dwellings and the rationalization of building consent processes. The paper 
reinforces the view that changes lessening the degree of oversight by Building Consent 
Authorities (BCAs) to building work should proceed cautiously, and then only after the 
appropriate back up legislative and educational systems have had time to coalesce and prove 
their effectiveness. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, five years after the introduction of the first nationally binding performance based New Zealand 
Building Code, a change was made to the NZ Standard NZ3602 to allow the use of untreated kiln-dried 
pinus radiata in timber house framing. This change, which was subsequently retracted in 2004, has had 
significant and long-term consequences for the NZ building industry in that it led to a period where 
moisture problems became the single most common reason for unsatisfactory building performance in 
New Zealand. (Murphy 2003) 
The rapid uptake of new cladding materials in the 1980s saw a decrease in the use of the traditional 
weatherboard and brick construction here in NZ and increased use of both face sealed proprietary rigid 
sheet cladding systems and the once commonly used, but largely forgotten, traditional stucco cladding 
system. The upsurge in the use of these “new” cladding materials coincided with other changes in the 
building industry. The running down of the apprenticeship programme, a rise in the number of apartment 
buildings under construction and a corresponding move away from traditional fixed price contracts to 
other forms of construction procurement to meet the rapid growth in this particular corner of the housing 
sector, all combined to create a period of uncertainty that saw many operators handling new systems 
and materials in complex building forms without the necessary background and training.  
The pre Building Act environment traditionally saw inspectorate attention during construction 
concentrated on the structural aspects of the building framework, typically the structural integrity of the 
flooring, walls (including bracing) and roof. Cladding integrity and the inspection thereof were not 
considered as important elements in the checking process. Cladding design and installation methods on 
the other hand, followed well-formulated design and build procedures using materials familiar to the 
industry. By and large, for these traditional brick and timber weatherboard structures, particularly where 
free of insulation, this approach to construction oversight was satisfactory.  
The advent of more complex cladding systems, elevation profiles and larger, more complex structures 
within the domestic market in the 1980s and 1990s, along with the introduction of monolithic type face 
fixed cladding systems, cavity insulation and kiln dried chemical free timber studs meant this approach 
was no longer sufficient. Yet both designer and the local authority consent processor were slow to adapt 
to the fall off in construction quality. 
 
Deficiencies in the external building fabric continued to become apparent as inquiry and debate over the 
quality of construction intensified. In 2001 a report by the writer commissioned by the Building Industry 
Authority (BIA) (Murphy 2000) that surveyed some 287 pre-purchase reports indicated some 60% of the 
dwellings inspected let in moisture through the cladding to an unacceptable degree. Whilst buildings in 
New Zealand had always leaked to some degree (NZ is a coastal climate and capable of extreme 
climate variation) what was different and new and picked up by the survey, was the significant 
percentage increase in cladding systems letting in moisture (compared to building defects) in the period 
following the introduction of the National Building Code in 1991. This can be clearly seen in Figure 1, 
where the graph columns indicating defects for the cladding case reviewed is to a similar proportion for 
all periods except the 1990s. In this last column the ratio of defects to the number of cladding cases 
reviewed increases significantly. 
 
Figure 1: Defect v Cladding Cases 
The societal factors briefly outlined above were not the only reason for building deficiencies. Causes 
identified in the report of the Overview Group in Weathertightness (Hunn 2002), a report commissioned 
by the Government in 2002 to investigate the causes of building failure due to moisture ingress, 
nominated a significant number of contributory causes including:  
 Inadequacy in the Building Code and Approved Documents 
 Inadequate documentation supplied for building consent. 
 Insufficient checking at building consent stage. 
 Inadequacy of building products, materials and components including evaluation of their 
suitability of fitness of purpose. 
 Inadequate contract documentation  
 Inadequate trade skills and supervision on site 
 Lack of co-operation and sharing of responsibility on site.  
1.1 Additional government initiatives. 
The public reaction to the Hunn Report was such that Government felt compelled to put into place 
additional procedures designed to restore public confidence in the building industry. One of these was 
the Weathertight Homes Resolution Service Act 2002, which set up a framework for mediation and 
adjudication between owner, contractor and other stakeholders. This act was later replaced by the 
WHRS Act 2006, which came into force on 1
st
 April 2007, creating in turn the Weathertight Homes 
Tribunal, a judicially independent Tribunal providing adjudication on matters of weathertightness.  
Additional initiatives included the movement of the Building Industry Authority (BIA), a crown entity, from 
the Internal Affairs ministry to the more proactive Ministry of Economic Development. Not content with 
these changes, and facing strong criticism from the public and media over inadequacies in the BIA‟s role 
within the ongoing saga, the government in November 2004 established the Department of Building and 
Housing and absorbed the Building Industry Authority (BIA) functions into the new Department. 
Government intentions to tighten up controls associated with building and construction were signaled in 
March 2003 through this ministry, culminating in the introduction of a major piece of new legislation, the 
Building Bill was read in Parliament on August 29
th
 2003. The Building Act 2004 came into effect in 
November 2004. (Murphy 2004) 
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2 THE BUILDING ACT 2004 
2.1 Summary of Changes 
The Building Act 2004 was a reactive response to the criticisms inherent in the Hunn report of 2002 and 
saw a considerable tightening up of procedures and policies surrounding the implementation of building 
controls. These may be summarized as follows: 
 Changes to the Durability regime (B2/AS1) -timber treatment. 
These changes, re-instigating timber treatment requirements removed in 1996, met strong resistance 
from some quarters in the lead-up submission process, particularly from timber industry suppliers and 
millers who saw severe restrictions in the traditional use of the Douglas Fir species as a result of 
increased treatment requirements. There were other concerns, including environmental concerns, 
particularly amongst the users who were to handle the new levels of treated timber and others including 
the NZ Institute of Architects (NZIA 2003), who saw the move to more environmental friendly products 
as a step in the right direction: 
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using untreated timber, including untreated radiata pine, 
in any building or housing construction. …[the only proviso would be that] if green or wet on 
installation, or if occasionally wetted after that, they should be allowed to dry out. (P.2) 
On the other hand respected research institutions like Forest Research (Hedley 2002) strongly 
supported a return to a comprehensive treatment regime for pinus radiata: 
Forest Research believes that the risk of decay or insect attack during the 50 years of required 
durability is too high to support the use of untreated radiate pine in structural applications (P.2) 
 Changes to Acceptable Solution E2/AS1 External Moisture.  
Revision of this Acceptable Solution within the Building Code was extensive and marked the first serious 
attempt to document in a prescriptive way standard domestic building practice since the Building Code 
was first introduced in 1991. Of particular note was the reintroduction to the building fraternity of the 
window flashing system, devices and systems largely lost to the industry since the introduction of the 
aluminum window in the 1970s and 1980s replaced the more traditional timber window profiles. Also 
significant was an attempt for the first time to access the degree of exposure of a particular building on a 
site based on the complexity of the elevation profile and its exposure to the elements, and to prescribe 
levels of compliance for the cladding system based on the results, a procedure that has seen the 
introduction of the drained cavity as an almost permanent feature of the domestic building envelope 
 Licensed Building Practitioner Scheme. 
A long term proposal to license Builders was introduced to redress the respective deficiency identified in 
the Hunn Report causes outlined above. The Licensed Building Practitioner‟s scheme, introduced in 
2004 with the new Act and modified in 2010 is, for the moment, a competency based, and until March 
2012, voluntary scheme that enables builders and trades people with a genuine track record “…to have 
their skills and knowledge formally recognized, whether they are trade-qualified or not. “ (Department of 
Building and Housing (C) 2010). Come March 2012 the consequences surrounding licensing tighten, 
with persons not licensed restricted from undertaking and signing off responsibility for certain types of 
building work, including, as can be expected, work associated with the construction of the weathertight 
cladding system, the primary structure, including foundations and framing, and the design of certain 
types of fire systems in small to medium sized residential apartments. In 2015 this competency based 
system moves to a qualification based one, with applicants after this date needing the appropriate trade 
qualification to qualify. 
 Territorial Authority Accreditation System 
A rigorous and comprehensive approval system, as outlined in the introduction, has replaced the laissez 
faire attitude of yesterday. An accreditation scheme regime for local councils (Territorial Authorities) 
instigated by the 2004 Building Act rewards competent Authorities and potentially removes the right to 
process building consents from the less able. It enables those displaying the appropriate competency 
skills to becoming building consent authorities (BCAs) 
 
2.2        The Cost of Leaking Buildings 
How successful this amended Act has been in terms of stopping the chronic decline in building 
standards is as yet hard to gauge. On-going public discontent over the continuing failure of claddings 
built in the later part of the 1990s, and the main reason for amending the Building Act in 2004, has kept 
the issue to the forefront politically and is no doubt a factor in recent attempts to again amend the 
Building Act. If it were to be judged, as indicated in Table 1, on estimates of the ever increasing cost to 
the economy of the ongoing social and physical costs of refurbishment, or assessed, as per the Covec 
Report (Irvine 2010) in a scale of natural disasters (figure 2), then it would be judged a distinct failure.  
Table 1: Cost Estimate Comparison 
Analysis Source  Year  Estimate no. homes with 
weather tightness issues 
Estimated cost 
assessed in  
2008 $ 
PwC Report (2009) 2009 42,000 $11.3 Billion  
PwC Report 2005 12,000 $1.1 Billion  
CINZ (2009) 2000 11,270 $890Million.  
 
An assessment of the Amended Act‟s effectiveness based on money terms is of course unfair. The 
consensus indicates most of the damage has been done to buildings between the years 1992 leading 
up to the change in legislation in 2004. The Price Waterhouse Coopers research report, completed in 
2009 was a recent attempt to bed down the costs to the economy of the long standing repairs likely as a 
result of systemic failure in the external cladding systems of residential buildings (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers 2009). PWC‟s estimate of $11.3 billion for failure costs to 42,000 dwellings is a projected 
increase from earlier reports and suggests most of the damage is still yet to be reported or indeed 
repaired. This is because: problems are not yet manifest, owners are in denial or lack finance to attend 
to litigation to recover costs or make repairs, there are procedural obstructions in claims within multi-unit 
complexes and, of particular concern, the slower manifestation of problems in the drier areas of the 
country (PWC 2009:2). 
 
Figure 2:  Cost Comparisons –Leaking Buildings (Irvine 2010) 
It does however indicate some grounds for optimism (PWC 2009 3): 
Failure rates since 2006 appear to be much lower than in previous years, suggesting changes in 
the regulatory requirements and building practices have addressed the major problems identified 
in the past and reduced the incidence of weathertightness issues.(p.3) 
If this is so, it suggests that the many changes brought to the Building Act 2004 discussed in this paper 
have begun to bear results. If so, why would the current Government wish to change the Act again, six 
years after the last comprehensive review?  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Napier
Earthquake
Cyclone Bola Floods (2004) Road
Crashes,
injuries (2008)
Leaky
Buildings
(1992-2020)
$ Billions (2008 $)
3 REVIEW OF THE BUILDING ACT 2004: 
3.1      Terms of Reference 
The reasons for the review appear to reflect apprehensions round the performance of the various 
stakeholders operating in this post 2004 environment. It also reflects Government apprehension hinted 
in the PWC report, that despite lower failure rates since 2006, there is plenty of more bad news to come! 
Whilst not wanting to take the „foot off the accelerator‟ in terms of compliance for appropriately complex 
structures, the Government had concerns that the parts of the Act are now too cumbersome, too costly 
to administer and not achieving the outcomes required by the Act‟s key principles. To quote the Minister 
of Building, there was a need to “…strike a better balance between the amount of control, the level of 
risk, and the capability and responsibility of those involved. (DBH (A) 2010). 
Consultation took the form of a DBH sponsored discussion document titledCost effective quality; the 
next generation building controls in New Zealand, and focused on: 
 Clarifying the purpose and principles of the Building Act and the requirements of the Building 
Code –implying much confusion still remains in the public domain about the nature of the Act 
and the difference between the Act and Code. 
 
 Moving to a more balanced approach to building control –thereby acknowledging there exists 
an undue reliance on building consent authorities to protect consumers from defective building 
work, even when, as the document states, “the consequences of failure are low”. (2010:6)  
 
 Building consumer confidence –including improving contracting practices, more effective 
warranties involving surety as security and better access to dispute resolution. Allied to this is 
the Licensed Building Practitioner Scheme, where the construction of “critical” elements of a 
building is to be eventually limited to approved accredited building operators. (2010:1) 
As can be expected, the call for submissions resulted in a range of responses from a wide cross section 
of the building industry. The 381 submissions received reflected a similar response rate to the 
controversial submissions on timber treatment some seven years earlier (Murphy 2004). The responses 
were collated in a Summary of Submissions document by the Department. The balance of this paper will 
focus on the responses to the exemption of minor work from the consent process, the “streamlining” of 
consents for low-risk buildings and suggestions to rationalize the building consent authority (BCA) 
consent processes.  
3.2 Rebalancing Building Control Processes. 
This section of reform was without doubt instigated to lessen the burden of oversight and control of 
building work from where it resides at present, viz with the building consent authorities (BCA), and to 
move a portion of the oversight to those considered professionally capable, e.g. architects, engineers 
and eventually, licensed building practitioners. The new proposals put forward for comment would have 
building consent authorities “targeting” buildings where “the risks and consequences of failure are 
greatest” (DHB (B) 2010:1), and by implication, moving less onerous consent oversight (and ratepayer 
liability) onto, once again, the private sector.  Two proposals were put forward, exemptions for minor 
work and the “streamlining” of low-risk residential building work. 
3.3 Exemptions for Minor Work 
This proposal suggested extending Schedule 1 of the Building Act and exempting more of the lower-risk 
work from consenting requirements, especially when it is undertaken or overseen by licensed building 
practitioners. The proposal was accompanied by a five page Schedule of likely exemptions, together 
with defined boundaries suggesting the likely limitations to those exemptions. (Figure 3) 
As could be expected, the range of responses underscored the difficulty of defining “risk” or specifically, 
“low-risk”, in a descriptive way. A proposal that, on the surface, seemed an attractive and simple 
proposition grew ever more suspect when viewed from the different viewpoints of the multiple 
stakeholders.  
 A Schedule 1 list suggestion, for example, that a qualified plumber be permitted to install a wood burner 
without building consent brought predicable but understandable opposition from the Fire Service 
Commission (DBH (B) 2010:19). 
….Nationally New Zealand has about 50 fires each year specifically attributed to incorrect 
installation of solid fuel space heaters 
It also brought opposition from a Building Consent Authority submission, which suggested the smallest 
operation can have an inherent high-risk consequence (2010): 
Although the installation of a solid fuel heater is a reasonably simple task, the consequences of 
failure can be life threatening, on an average 40% of inspections would fail mainly in the roof 
cavity area. I consider the only reason there has not been more fires is because the BCAs are 
inspecting.(p.19) 
ID Proposal Limitations Notes 
A Construction of a detached non-
habitable dwelling or habitable 
building that does not contain 
cooking facilities or plumbing, if:  
-single storey, and  
-floor area<20m2, and  
-floor level <1.0 m above ground 
level and 
-not closer than 1.0 m to any legal 
boundary or existing building, and 
-not required to be licensed in 
terms of the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms 
Act 1996, and  
-used in connection with an 
existing building 
-All work is subject to 
planning rules and 
controls 
-There is an existing 
exemption for 10m2 
sleepout 
-Should plumbing be 
exempt in these 
circumstances? 
J  Pipe and cable penetration 
through walls, if:  
-fire, structural and 
weathertightness performance of 
the building is not reduced 
-Guidance needed to 
support good 
installation 
solutions/practices 
 
Figure 3:  Proposed Additions to Schedule 1of the Building Act (DBH (A) 2010) 
Submitters debated the difficulties of defining the parameters that would reduce the level of risk to 
acceptable levels. Whilst the “definition of risk is itself risky…” (DHB (B) 2010:26) it was viewed as 
inherently bound in to the competency of the individual or group and the context of the activity. 
Risk is as much to do with the skills of those undertaking the work as the complexity of the 
design (P.29) 
The document did acknowledge the difficulties of assessing risk and commented on the veracity of 
submissions that proposed developing “effective tools” to accept the risk involved in any one application, 
including the adoption of “risk matrix” approach, developed in 2004 as a consequence of the review of 
the 1991 Building Act and operating within the E2/AS1 Building Code document. 
Other issues, underscoring the difficulties facing reform in this area, included the need for effective 
oversight and clear communication to the public and industry of the extent of exemptions. 
The importance of keeping property records was also emphasized by the Registered Master Builders 
Federation (2010): 
BCAs act as a repository for information relating to a building that is relatively static, consistent 
and available…. It is already an issue, when building defects occur, trying to locate who worked 
on the property, what they did and when they did it.With the scope of building work that can be 
done without a building consent increasing – where will this information be held? (P.21) 
Also mentioned was the need for on going monitoring of any exempt work categories to assess poor 
practices and any systemic issues. In other words, if you proceed, then proceed with caution!  
3.4      Exemptions for low-risk (simple residential) buildings  
In their quest to strike this better balance between regulation and risk, the DHB suggests LBP‟s, 
architects or registered engineers would take responsibility that certain low risk buildings, designed and 
constructed under their control, would comply with the Building Code. The BCA‟s role would in this case 
be limited to inspection of “critical construction points” along the route to building completion and it 
would be left to the LBP to oversee construction and/or construct and, either way, certify that the work is 
code compliant. 
The response in the Summary of Submissions indicated the building industry do not share the 
Government‟s optimism in the ability of the country‟s professional builders to achieve these ends. Whilst 
the scheme met with some favour from 92 submitters, a proportion of them (54) indicated reservation 
and conditions were necessary to make the proposals work. An additional 84 submitters indicating their 
opposition on the basis that the building industry is not sufficiently well enough educated or trained to 
take up this challenge (DHB (B) 2010). To quote a submission from the Inspectorate Association of NZ 
(IANZ 2010) 
It is not the complexity of a building that causes increased risk but rather the level of 
competence and commitment of the persons and organisations designing, planning, building, 
installing and checking the works.(p25) 
Should such a rebalance of responsibility take effect, it was considered imperative that the degree of 
risk be assessed (in itself acknowledged as a difficult task), and that suitable conditions apply (also 
difficult to define). These issues would include clearly assigned accountability and liability, increased 
skill levels, the keeping of accurate records, independent 3
rd
 party checks and balances, the alignment 
of incentives and monitoring to encourage “a quality culture” and minimize conflicts of interest. (DBH (B) 
2010:29) 
There is no evidence that licensing, without significant further training and assessment, will 
deliver Code compliant work (IANZ 2010:27) 
BCA inspections need to continue until professionals and LBPs have proven compliance 
competencies… (DHB (B) 2010:28) 
Our industry is not ready to be left to their (sic) own devices – unchecked they will get it wrong. 
(DHB (B) 2010:29) 
What in fact comes through in the submitters‟ views is a feeling of déjà vu about the consequences of 
Government intentions, this time round. Or, put another way, having (in the case of a BCA for example) 
come through the rigours of accreditation brought on by the 2004 Act reforms, with the consequent (and 
huge) upskilling of people and processes…having survived derision by media and lawsuits by 
disgruntled consumers, here is the Government wanting to revert back to days when control is once 
again in the hands of persons not (in the opinion of many) capable of undertaking the role! 
3.5 Building control systems. 
The Government in its request for review suggestions implied much could be done to improve the 
administration of the building control system in such a way as to reduce costs, and improve the 
consistency and efficiency of the consent processing system (DBH (A) 2010:39). By implication then, 
the inference is that the present system lacks consistency, is too cumbersome and costly and 
represents a lack of value for money. And, could the private sector do it better? 
Feedback to the suggestions was understandably mixed, but impressions suggest no appetite for 
radical change in a BCA system still settling in the Building Act‟s 2004 arduous accreditation 
requirements. There were distinct advantages seen in a strong BCA continuing to be in the forefront of 
building consent control, if only because they are a “ known repository for property related information”. 
Many saw advantages in the BCAs continuing to work towards a “...nationally consistent, objective, 
central consenting system that eliminates the 70 add different systems that currently operate”. (RMBF 
2010:41) Others saw value in the local, smaller unit remaining viable if only because “Larger BCAs are 
less efficient for consent processing times and cost.” (DHB (B) 2010:40). 
Attitudes to a private sector role were mixed, with 68 supporting some (limited) activity and 56 against 
any private sector input. Apprehensions included issues around accountability, longevity, insurance 
cover, maintaining records and maintaining the necessary skills levels. BCAs saw themselves as 
undertaking a statutory public role similar to that of the public health and state education, needing to 
cope with all eventualities, yet unable (as per the private health and education sector) to pick and 
choose the “lowest risk clients” (2010:42) 
4 CONCLUSION 
The principle of less BCA involvement (and more but limited private sector involvement) in minor work 
and “low-risk” housing was seen as desirable if it meant less drain on the ratepayer from a resource and 
liability perspective and if resources could be better freed up for the more complex, high risk projects 
requiring the full weight of BCA care and attention. But - this only in the longer term, and after careful 
consideration to the quality and performance of LBPs and others, and in any event not without adequate 
oversight and record keeping by the BCA.  
The PWC report (2009) suggests building failure rates appear to be much lower since 2006. Yet the 
same report estimates for the reasons stated that most of the damage is still yet to be reported. For this 
reason alone the Building Consent Authority should remain at the core of the consenting process. This 
said, improvements in efficiency are needed, and would, given the right incentives, happen with time. 
There was no appetite for radical restructure. The Government‟s stated aim to “strike a better balance 
between the amount of control, the level of risk, and the capacity and responsibility of those involved” 
(DHB (A) 2010:1) was, it is sensed, viewed with a slight measure of skepticism and a weariness by 
many, particularly one senses by those old enough to remember the buoyant optimism of the 1991 
“performance based” Building Act, and the subsequent “lack of performance” that ultimately resulted 
and still haunts the building industry today.  
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